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In the light of the recent political events in Italy this paper aims to quantitatively analyze the impact 
of a Flat-Tax and minimum income based fiscal reform for different cohort ages in an Overlapping 
Generation (OLG) model with permanent labour productivity across agents and a stochastic labour 
income component. Two Computational Experiments are conducted: the former is a Flat-Tax only 
for the personal labour income, the latter involves the same marginal rate for personal labour and 
capital income. It results that to finance a minimum income measure in support of every citizen below 
the absolute poverty threshold, it is required a marginal rate of respectively 20% and 23%. The 
amount granted would be equal to the difference of the absolute poverty threshold (€780 in Italy) and 
the total income of the targeted citizen. The results of this study seem to reflect the forecasts of overall 
growth in the aggregate output and consumption of the economy: a deeper analysis show that actually 
the labour supplied and aggregate welfare decrease while the inequality considerably increases. 
 
SOMARIO: 
À luz dos recentes eventos políticos em Itália, este artigo visa analisar quantitativamente o impacto 
de uma reforma fiscal baseada na renda fixa e no imposto mínimo para diferentes idades de 
coorte  num modelo de Overlapping Generation (OLG) com produtividade permanente do trabalho 
entre agentes e um componente estocástico do rendimento trabalho. Duas Experiências 
Computacionais são conduzidas: a primeira é um imposto fixo somente para a renda de trabalho 
pessoal, a segunda envolve a mesma taxa marginal para trabalho pessoal e capital. Resulta que, para 
financiar uma medida de rendimento mínimo, de forma a apoiar todos os cidadãos abaixo da limiar 
de pobreza absoluta, é necessária uma taxa marginal de respectivamente 20% e 23%. A quantia 
admitida seria igual à diferença do limiar de pobreza absoluta (€780 na Itália) e a renda total do 
cidadão visado. O resultado deste estudo parece refletir as previsões de crescimento da produção e 
consumo agregados à economia: uma análise mais profunda mostra que, na verdade, a mão-de-obra 
fornecida e o bem-estar agregado diminuem enquanto a desigualdade aumenta consideravelmente. 
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Italy’s coming through a tough period during the last years. 2018 in particular has seen concerning 
breackdowns in the peninsula’s economy. Above the many issues, two seems to be the major 
problems: on the one hand the estimated 190 billion euros of fiscal evasion and a tax gap of 23,28% 
that place the country in the worst position among the EU members. On the other an alarming 
unemployment rate, especially for early age citizens; with the 39,5% of young workers unemployed, 
in December 2018 Italy registered in fact the second highest rate in Europe.  
The GDP growth forecasts for 2019 are not optimistic: they range from the +0,6% of the Monetary 
Fund to the more problematic -0,2% estimated few weeks ago by OCSE. According to these 
previsions, and the aggravating circumstance that the Quantitative Easing just stopped, the Italian 
ground seems not to leave any margin for a sustainable debt, that would indeed require an economic 
growth rate higher than the interest paid on the debt itself.   
2018 have been a troubled year also for the Italian political scene. Never in the history of the 
peninsula’s republic it happened to wait so much for a definitive election: five rounds of 
consultations, two exploratory terms for the presidents of the House and Senate and two pre-
mandates. The Giuseppe Conte government (M5s-Lega) finally have established obtaining the 
majority of the consensus largely due to the promise of two reforms: “Flat-Tax 15%” for the personal 
labour income, to replace the current progressive IRPEF tax, and “Reddito di Cittadinanza”, a pro-
poor minimum income measure, and unemployment benefit, that would be granted from the mid of 
2019 to citizens receiving less than the estimated absolute poverty threshold: only together these two 
measures should, according to the major M5s-Lega economists’ opinion, stimulate and boost the 
economy. However the positions on the matter diverge within the country and a great debate has risen 
during the last year especially about the affordability of these two expensive measures, estimated to 
cost around 80 billion euros: to grant an minimum amount to poor citizens together with the promise 
of a consistent cut in the taxes seems hardly implementable in the common sense without lowering 
the public expenditure, increasing the consumption tax or the public debt, but renewed M5s-Lega 
economists such as Claudio Borghi, Alberto Bagnai and Michele Geraci still claim that it is 
sustainable and that the Italian economy will benefit from the reform.   
In Italy firms are not able to find skilled young workers, and young people cannot find job: this 
incompatibility represents one of the major concerns for the economic recovery as demand and supply 
don’t meet each other. A minimum income, besides being a pro-poor measure that an advanced 
economy should implement for an ethic fairness, would allow for an improvement in the efficiency 
of the labour force, by the moment that young people can so find an occupation that suites better their 
personal skills without the concern of being unemployed. On the other hand, even if this can improve 
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the efficiency of the allocation of the human capital, Italy also required a reform to increase the labour 
demand, that is to create new jobs: a constant marginal rate of 15% attract new investments, and with 
them new jobs opportunities. Regarding the costs of these measures, according to the abovementioned 
economists, it would be partially compensated by the increase of the aggregate consumption level. 
That is, through the Keynesian multiplier the GDP of the country should grow at a bigger share than 
the expenditure for these measures.  
Moreover, a Flat-Tax 15% discourage tax evasion. In most of the countries that have adopted similar 
fiscal schemes the historical evidence (look for instance Keen (2006) and Hall (2013)) as taught that 
a simpler tax system enhances the tax compliance: if citizens, instead of living in a complex and 
abstruse fiscal system, are more aware on how much taxes they have to pay to the government and 
they perceive them as a fair amount, than they should be more inclined to the “fiscal loyalty”.  
But again, after one year of political mandate and public discussion, it is nowadays still not clear 
where the government would find the money for this reform, and the persistent lack of quantitative 
studies on the matter does not help to consolidate an objective position about it. As economist, it is 
in my interest to further investigate on the possible outcomes of such a reform and to provide some 
results that quantify the impact that a fiscal system based on a Flat-Tax and a minimum income would 
have on Italian citizens in different ages.  
In a good number of studies focusing on optimal taxation it results that a Flat-Tax based fiscal system 
brings gains in term of labour supply, consumption and capital accumulation, compared to a 
progressive one. Conesa and Krueger (2006) compute the optimal progressivity of the labour income 
tax for US in an Overlapping Generation model, accounting for household’s heterogeneity. It is so 
quantitatively characterized the optimal income tax system in an economic environment where 
insurance, equity and efficiency effects are present simultaneously. The main quantitative result 
found is that the optimal income tax structure is well approximated by a flat income tax and a fixed 
deduction; under such a reform, most of the agents obtain welfare gains and according to their 
outcomes the middle-income households are the ones that would suffer the most (they would face a 
higher income tax bill), whereas both high-income and low-income households would benefit. 
Similar results reflect Ventura (1999)’s findings and are supported by Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan 
(2009). Aaberge, Colombino and Storm (2004) conduct an analysis of the welfare effects on married 
couples of replacing the Italian progressive tax system by three alternative hypothetical reforms: a 
Flat-Tax, a negative income tax, and a work fare scheme. The results suggest that there are margins 
for improvement upon the current system for both the efficiency and the equality criterion. According 
to their outcomes the estimated benefits of the reform would come from a good response in the labour 
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supply of poor and middle-class households, whereas the wealthier citizens appear to be much less 
responsive to changes in the tax rates. Scutella (2004) studied the implications of the introduction of 
a basic income and Flat-Tax system in Australia in a General Equilibrium and microeconomic model. 
To provide a basic income levels coinciding with current benefits rates results to be costly, with a 
marginal rate required to ensure revenue neutrality that turns out unsustainable. Such a system, while 
more equitable and social welfare enhancing than the one in use at the time, was found to have likely 
adverse labour supply responses confounding the cost of the system.  Shubert (2018) quantifies the 
economic effects of a Flat-Tax and minimum income reform proposal for Germany. The effects are  
negligible, even negative for what regard the level of employment and GDP within the country: these 
results cast doubts on whether such a fundamental reform would have positive welfare effects.    
About tax evasion and avoidance, it is possible to find studies in support of a progressive fiscal 
system. For instance, Gamannossi and D. Rablen (2017) basing on the work of Alm and McCallin 
(1990) describe avoidance as a risky asset owing to the possibility of effective anti-avoidance 
measures by the tax authority: they consider then the implications for optimal auditing of tax 
avoidance. By analyzing the audit function under progressive, proportional and regressive tax systems 
they find that less enforcement is required under a flat tax than under a progressive one in eliminating 
evasion and avoidance, for every level of income. This outcome confirms Chander and Wilde (1998) 
findings, according to which a regressive tax results to be the optimal hypothetical fiscal system in 
term of tax evasion and avoidance. 
This paper aims to analyze and quantify the outcome for households in different ages, of a Flat-Tax 
and a minimum income measure reforming the progressive fiscal system in Italy. This is done 
employing an Overlapping Generations Model with permanent labour productivity across agents and 
an idiosyncratic stochastic component, calibrated to reflect the empirical evidence found in 
microeconometrics studies based on Italians’ data. Two Computational Experiments are conducted:  
- The first is a Flat-Tax reforming the current progressive IRPEF tax on the individual labour 
income. The marginal rate is derived so that the government finances a minimum income 
targeting all agents under the absolute poverty threshold (quantile 0.084 of the income 
distribution according to ISTAT), keeping fixed the public expenditure. The amount granted 
to each individual under that limit is computed as the difference between the poverty threshold 
and his total earnings. 
- The second experiment is analogous to the first one. The difference consists in setting the 
same flat marginal rate for both the individual labour and capital income. 
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The paper is structured as follow: in the following paragraph it will be exposed the 2018 Italian fiscal 
system. Chapter 2 provides a brief review on OLG models. In Chapter 3 it is reported the model 
employed for this study. Chapter 4 and 5 describe respectively the process of calibration of the 
benchmark economy and the Computational Experiments. To follow Chapter 6, in which the results 
are discussed, and finally Chapter 7 concludes the paper. 
1.1 The 2018 Italian fiscal-benefits system 
The Italian fical system is national with little differences among regions and municipalities due to 
some local autonomy and mainly affecting the complex system of local property taxes. The individual 
labour income tax (IRPEF) is progressive and incomes deriving from capital gains and return on 
capital are mainly subject to a separate taxation. The main source through which the government 
raises funds for public expenditure are: 
- Personal labour Income Tax – IRPEF: a progressive tax on income structured in five brackets. 
The taxable base is the total income (sum of working income, buildings and lands income, 
quotes from dividends, dividends gains) and family dimension and composition for eventual 
deductions and allowances.  
- Separate Taxation on Capital Income: capital income, even though already partially included 
in the IRPEF base, is mainly subject to a separate taxation.  
- Municipality Property Taxes – IMU and TASI: buildings and lands, like capital income, are 
subject to a separate taxation. IMU and TASI weight on buildings or lands’ owners or to 
individuals who enjoy real rights on these estates.  
- Corporate Tax – IRES: It is a proportional tax applied to all corporations, cooperatives, mutual 
insurance, public and private entities other than the special companies. The premise for the 
Corporate Tax is the ownership of an income belonging to one of the following categories: 
real estate, capital, employed and self-employed work, corporation.  
- Regional Tax on Business – IRAP: a special regional tax on productive activities located in 
the area of regional competence. Therefore, it is applied to companies and individuals subject 
to IRES, companies subject to personal income tax (partnerships and sole proprietorships), 
banks, insurance companies and self-employed workers. The rate change according to the 
business sector. 
Italy, like most of the modern developed countries, is characterized by a fragmented benefits system, 
made of a multitude of instruments. According to the tradition, these social measures can be 
categorized in Social Insurance (family and social allowances, benefits related to the end of the 
working activity, to the temporary suspension of the working activity, to the reduction in working 
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ability) and Social Assistance (family support, Pro-poor allowances, Benefits related to the reduction 
in working ability). Thresholds for means-tested benefits and contributions are yearly updated by the 
National Statistical Office.   
Finally, the Social Contributions that employees, employers and self-employed individuals pay on 
earned income that are managed by the National Institute of Social Security (INPS), a private entity 
that regulates the pension system within the country. An exhaustive description of the measures 
composing the 2018 Italian fiscal and benefits system can be found in Appendix 1. 
1.1.1 Pro-poor measures evolution in Italy 
During the past decades Italy, as many advanced modern countries, have started to develop 
instruments pro-poor oriented to fight the wealth inequalities across the country. The design of a 
national measure of minimum guaranteed income has started in 1997 with a first proposal formulated 
by the ‘Commissione Onofri’ appointed by the Centre-Left government in power at that time. The 
proposal has been tested in a sample of local areas before being stopped when a Centre-Right came 
to power two years later: the competence on support policies was so transferred to the regions, which 
since then effectively became responsible for the design of pro-poor policies.   
A more recent national minimum income scheme, the ‘Reddito di Inclusione- REI’ was proposed in 
2017 by the ‘Goveno Gentiloni’ and  have been implemented in 2017: this instrument is meant to 
address the share of the population living in absolute poverty and aims to fill the gap between the 
resources available in the families and the minimum level of income required to fulfill their 
fundamental needs. Unfortunately, even though it was designed to be universal, the available funds 
have been sufficient to accomplish only partially the desired goal, and overall the REI barely impacted 
the fraction of the population that was meant to sustain.  
2 OLG models: literature review 
Macroeconomic models provide an efficient tool for analyzing the impact of fiscal and policies in 
more or less complex representations of real economies. A wide number of models have been created 
to date and offer different combination of features such as agents’ heterogeneity, multiple sectors, 
overlapping generations, adequate treatment of uncertainty and expectations. The exponential 
technological and theoretical progress in general or partial equilibrium models has reached insights 
that would not have been possible with simpler models and their limits. These tools have become the 
framework to use to conduct a quantitative analysis of a fiscal policy and so to be able to carry on a 
comprehensive evaluation of the dangers and potentials of a reform. In this literature review it is 




2.1 The baseline OLG model structure 
Overlapping Generation (OLG) models analyze the general equilibrium properties and growth 
dynamics of economies inhabited by finitely lived population in different cohorts ages: incorporating 
demographic transition, they have the potential to increase the predictive power compared to models 
with infinitely lived agents. They became popular mainly thanks to the seminal works carried on by 
Diamond (1965) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).   
The core process in an OLG model follows the choices of a representative household regarding 
variables such as education, savings, labour supply and according to a utility function that regulate 
his/her preferences: this allow to project the wealth distribution for agents in different cohorts ages 
over time.  
2.1.1 The Diamond model 
The most basic, two-period OLG model consists in a close economy with only firms and households 
(no government) and exogeneous labour. In this model agents supply labour and receive an income 
in return, that will spend on consumption or savings to invest in capital, since they own the firms. 
The whole amount invested in the first period is consumed in the second one. If 𝑁𝑡 denote the size of 
young generation of agents and 𝑁𝑡−1 the old cohorts, and assuming a constant rate 𝑛, 𝑠𝑜 𝑁𝑡 = (1 +
𝑛)𝑁𝑡−1. The young generation supplies one unit of labour (exogeneous variable) in exchange of a 
fixed income 𝑤𝑡  and chooses how to allocate it between consumption and savings. In the next period 
the same generation becomes old and retire, so live with the investments made previously.  
2.2 literature evolution of OLG models 
2.2.1 Generations and cohort size 
Extending the same concept of the basic Diamond OLG model, the literature has evolved considering 
more than just two period. For instance, a four-period OLG model have been elaborated by Buyse et 
al (2012) with three working generations, heterogeneous in labour choice, leisure and skills and one 
retired. Magnani and Mercenier (2009) study the variation of choices for retired individuals in 
different cohort ages employing an eight-period setup with five working generations and three retired. 
The recent literature has extended the analysis to include up to 100 generations of age groups: these 
models allow to generate predictions of consumption and saving decisions that at times closely 
resemble the target economy (for instance Muto et al. 2012; Beetsma and Bucciol 2009; Cerný et al. 
2006). Additional studies can be mentioned, as the one of Kudrna et al. (2014) in which individuals 
aged 0 to 20 can rely on the public system for education and healthcare costs, reducing the amount 
granted for pensions to the retiree.  
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2.2.2 Individual heterogeneity 
Including additional intra-generations heterogeneity allows to produce a more realistic variety of 
consumption and savings paths. One of the sources of heterogeneity that has been employed in most 
of these studies comes by assuming that agents are born in different ability levels: ability becomes 
then a productivity factor that impact individuals’ earnings. Fougère and Mérette (1999) propose a 
spill-over model in which the aggregate savings depend on the post-secondary education of the agents 
in the economy. A similar heterogeneity source can be found in Magnani and Mercenier (2009) or 
either in Buyse et al. (2012). 
2.2.3 Demographic changes introduced by immigration 
OLG models provides an excellent tool in the field of study that analyses the migration of agents from 
one market to another. Many traditional models fail to capture this complex aspect of one economy: 
the major issue is that the savings, labour choices and consumption patterns can diverge consistently 
between citizens and immigrants. Fougère et al. (2004), to mention one, analyze the immigration 
phenomenon in Canada employing a six-region OLG model. 
2.2.4 OLG Models with Government and Social Security 
To conclude this fast overview on OLG models, they provide a useful framework to analyze the effect 
of government policies and reforms. Bucciol et al. (2014) study different policies in an OLG model 
with heterogeneous agents modelling the joint labour supply choices between man and women in a 
couple. The analysis is conducted for three European countries: France, Italy and Sweden. They show 
that the model is capable of matching relevant aggregate statistics of the three countries and provide 
examples of policy experiments that can be simulate, analyzing the outcomes on both inequality and 
individual welfare. Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2007) compute the optimal progressive capital and 
labor income tax in an OLG model with stochastic income shocks, where households are 
heterogeneous in ability level. They find that the optimal capital income tax rate approximates a Flat-
Tax of 23% with a fix deduction corresponding to about $6,000.   
The model employed in this study follows the guidelines of the Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2007) 
one, with adjustments made to better reflect the 2018 Italian economy and fiscal system. A full 
description follows in Chapter 3. 
3 Methodology: overview of the model 
3.1 Demographics 
The economy examined for this study is populated by 𝐽 overlapping generations. Every year a 
continuum of new agents is born, and the overall population grows at a fix rate 𝑛. Each household 
faces a probability of dying in every period, which is dependent on the age. In specific, the probability 
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of being alive in period 𝑗 + 1 conditional being alive in period 𝑗, is 𝜓𝑗 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑗 +
1|𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑗). Households can live up to a maximum age 𝐽, so that 𝜓𝐽 = 0. The fraction of the agents 
who dies in every period before reaching age 𝐽 leaves accidental bequests, denoted by 𝑇𝑟𝑡, that are 
redistributed in a lump-sum manner across the population. At age 𝑗𝑟 households retire and receive a 
pension 𝑆𝑆𝑡 that is financed by a flat income tax 𝜏𝑠𝑠,𝑡. The Social Security taxes base is labour income 
𝑦. 
3.2 Endowments, preferences and agents’ heterogeneity. 
Each household starts his life without assets (besides the eventual bequests distributed) and can 
supply up to one unit of productive time every period. They can either spend their time working in a 
competitive market or consuming leisure. Their consumption-leisure preferences {𝑐𝑗 , (1 −  𝑙𝑗)}𝑗=1
𝐽
 are 











 where 𝑐𝑗 and 𝑙𝑗 are respectively the level of consumption and labour in period 𝑗. The parameter ϒ 
measures how important is consumption relative to leisure, and 𝜎 controls the degree of risk aversion. 
Finally,  𝛽  is the time discount factor. 
In this model three sources of heterogeneity are considered to better represent the Italian households’ 
labour productivity: 
- An age-specific labor productivity component ԑ𝑗: households of different ages have a different 
age productivity ԑ𝑗. After the retirement age 𝑗𝑟, by assumption the agents’ productivity is set 
equal to zero, that is  ԑ𝑗 = 0.    
- Households differ in abilities 𝛼𝑖 : they are born and live as one of M possible ability types  
𝑖 𝜖 𝐼. It is not possible for them to switch from an ability type to another during their lifetime. 
The probability of being born with ability 𝛼𝑖 is denoted by 𝑝𝑖 > 0. The ability type 𝛼𝑖 in 
addition to age-specific productivity component ԑ𝑗, determine agents’ average deterministic 
labor productivity, the permanent component of this labour productivity process.  
-  Agents of the same ability type and with the same age differ in an idiosyncratic uncertainty 
with respect to their labor productivity, that represent the last component of agents’ 
heterogeneity in this model. The stochastic process describing labor productivity status is the 




𝑄𝑡(ƞ, 𝐸) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(ƞ𝑡+1 𝜖 𝐸|ƞ𝑡 = ƞ) = 𝑄(ƞ, 𝐸) (2) 
Here ƞ𝑡 𝜖 𝐸 denotes a stochastic realization of the labor productivity in time 𝑡. Households 
start their life at the same average productivity level ƞ =  ∑ ƞ𝛱(ƞ)ƞ  where ƞ 𝜖 𝐸 and 𝛱(ƞ) is 
the probability of ƞ under the stationary distribution. The stochastic process manifests 
different realizations for labour productivity, and so generates cross-sectional productivity, 
income and wealth distribution that become more dispersed as the cohorts grow. The agents 
maximize their expected utility in a lifetime prospective. These expectations are taken with 
respect to the stochastic processes that leads to the idiosyncratic labor productivity. 
Every agent is characterized in a given time by the measures (𝑎𝑡, ƞ𝑡, 𝑖, 𝑗), where 𝑎𝑡 are the asset 
holdings (of one period, risk-free bonds), ƞ𝑡 is stochastic labor productivity status at date t, 𝑖 is the 
ability type and 𝑗 is the age. An agent of type (𝑎𝑡, ƞ𝑡, 𝑖, 𝑗) choose to work 𝑙𝑗 hours and then earn pre-
tax labor income ԑ𝑗𝛼𝑖ƞ𝑡𝑙𝑗𝑤𝑡, that depend on the wage per efficiency unit of labor 𝑤𝑡, the age specific 
productivity component ԑ𝑗, the ability type 𝛼𝑖 and the state ƞ𝑡. φ𝑡(𝑎𝑡, ƞ𝑡, 𝑖, 𝑗) denote the probability 
measure of agents of type (𝑎𝑡, ƞ𝑡, 𝑖, 𝑗).  
3.3 Firms 
The technology describing the firms’ production process is represented by a Cobb–Douglas 
production function with constant return to scale. As standard with a perfect competition market it is 
assumed the existence of a representative firm operating this technology. The resource constraint is 
given by the following function: 
𝐶𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 ⩽ 𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝑁𝑡
1−𝛼 (3) 
Here 𝐶𝑡 , 𝐾𝑡 and 𝑁𝑡 represent respectively the aggregate consumption, capital stock and labour supply 
in time  𝑡. The term 𝐴𝑡 = (1 + 𝑔)
𝑡−1𝐴1 captures the technological progress.  
The calibration of 𝐴, as in Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2007), is normalized to 1: in accordance with 
similar studies on fiscal policies evaluation this paper abstract from technological progress. In this 
way it allows to represent households in the economy with a labour supply elasticity that is consistent 
with the microeconometric evidence.  
3.4 Government policy 
The government levies taxes to finance public spending and runs a balanced budget social security 
system represented in the model by the transfers 𝑆𝑆𝑡. The tax rate 𝜏𝑠𝑠,𝑡 is set to assure that the budget 
balance of the system time by time. The pulic consumption {𝐺𝑡}𝑡=1
∞  is given exogenously and has 
three fiscal instruments to be financed: the government levies a proportional tax 𝜏𝑐,𝑡 on consumption 
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expenditures, it tax capital income of households 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) according to a constant tax rate 𝜏𝐾,𝑡, 
and finally levies a personal income tax on each individual’s labour income. The income of an agent 
before the social security tax is defined as 𝑦𝑝𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡ԑ𝑗𝛼𝑖ƞ𝑙𝑡 (4)  and depend on the wage per efficiency 
unit of labor 𝑤𝑡. A part of the social contribution, in specific one third in Italy, is paid by the employer: 
the model takes this into account. This part is represented by 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡 = 0.33𝜏𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑤𝑡ԑ𝑗𝛼𝑖ƞ𝑙𝑡 (5).The 
income base for the personal labour income tax of a household is so defined as: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = {
𝑦𝑝𝑡 − 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡   𝑖𝑓  𝑗 < 𝑗𝑟 
 0                     𝑖𝑓  𝑗 ≥ 𝑗𝑟  
 
(6) 
The individual tax function is 𝑇[. ], and 𝑇[𝑦] is the total tax liability on a labour income equal to 𝑦.  
3.5 The structure of the market 
In this economy agents cannot insure against stochastic labor income shocks by trading insurance 
contracts. They can however trade one period risk-free bonds to insure themselves against the risk of 
a decrease of their labor productivity in the future. This is limited, however, by impossibility of agents 
to sell bonds short. Basically, a stringent borrowing constraint is imposed upon all agents to prevents 
them from dying in debt, in presence of the positive conditional probability of death. 
3.6 The competitive equilibrium 
In this paragraph it is defined the competitive and stationary equilibrium in this economy (see 
Definition 1 and 2 below), following the same baseline of Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2007), with 
little adjustments mainly regarding the .For each agent, the state variables describing his status are 
personal asset holdings 𝑎, labor productivity ƞ, ability type 𝑖 and age 𝑗. The aggregate picture of the 
overall economy in a given time 𝑡 is described by the agents’ measure φ𝑡 over asset positions, labor 
productivity status, ability and age.   
Let 𝑎 𝜖 𝑹+, ƞ 𝜖 𝐸 = {ƞ1, ƞ2, … , ƞ𝑛}, 𝑖 𝜖 𝐼 = {1,2, … , 𝑀}, j 𝜖 𝐽 = {1,2, … , 𝐽}, and 𝑺 =  𝑹+ ∗ 𝐸 ∗ 𝐼 ∗ 𝐽. 
Let 𝑩(𝑹+) be the Borel σ-algebra of 𝑹+ and 𝑷(𝐸), 𝑷(𝐼), 𝑷(𝐽) the power sets of 𝐸, 𝐼 and 𝐽. Let M 
be the set of al finite measure over the measurable space (𝑺, 𝑩(𝑹+) ∗  𝑷(𝐸) ∗  𝑷(𝐼) ∗ 𝑷(𝐽)).  
Definition 1: Given a sequence of social security replacement rates {𝑏𝑡}𝑡=1
∞ , consumption tax rates 
{𝜏𝑐,𝑡}𝑡=1
∞  and government expenditure {𝐺𝑡}𝑡=1
∞  and initial conditions 𝐾1 and φ1, a competitive 
equilibrium is a sequence of functions for the household, {𝑣𝑡 , 𝑐𝑡, 𝑎
′
𝑡, 𝑙𝑡 ∶ 𝑺 → 𝑹+}𝑡=1
∞  of production 
plans for the firm, {𝑁𝒕, 𝐾𝒕}𝑡=1
∞ , government income tax functions {𝑇𝑡 ∶  𝑹+ → 𝑹+}𝑡=1
∞ , social security 
taxes { 𝜏𝑠𝑠,𝑡}𝑡=1
∞  and benefits {𝑆𝑆𝑡}𝑡=1
∞ , prices {𝑤𝒕, 𝑟𝒕}𝑡=1
∞ , transfers {𝑇𝑟𝒕}𝑡=1
∞ , and measures {φ𝒕}𝑡=1
∞ , 
with φ𝑡 𝜖 𝐌 such that: 
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3.6.1 Households  
 Given prices, policies, transfers and initial conditions, for each time, the agent choose the value 𝑣𝑡 
that maximizes the Bellman equation (where 𝑐𝑡, 𝑎
′
𝑡 and 𝑙𝑡 are his policy functions): 
   𝑣𝑡(𝑎, ƞ, 𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑐,𝑎′,𝑙
 (𝑢(𝑐, 1 −  𝑙) +  𝛽𝜓𝑗 ∫ 𝑣𝑡+1(𝑎
′, ƞ′, 𝑖, 𝑗 + 1)𝑄(ƞ, 𝑑ƞ′))        (7)                subject to: 
(1 + 𝜏𝑐,𝑡  )𝑐 + 𝑎
′ = (1 − 0.66𝜏𝑠𝑠,𝑡)
𝑤𝑡
1+0.33𝜏𝑠𝑠,𝑡
ԑ𝑗𝛼𝑖ƞ𝑙𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡(1 − 𝜏𝐾,𝑡)) (𝑎 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) − 𝑇𝑡[𝑦𝑡]   if 𝑗 < 𝑗𝑟   (8)  
(1 + 𝜏𝑐,𝑡  )𝑐 + 𝑎
′ = 𝑆𝑆𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡(1 − 𝜏𝐾,𝑡)) (𝑎 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) − 𝑇𝑡[𝑆𝑆𝑡]         if 𝑗 ≥ 𝑗𝑟,      (9) 
 𝑎′ ≥ 0, 𝑐 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 1      (10)     
3.6.2 Firms  
In equilibrium, prices 𝑤𝒕 and 𝑟𝒕 satisfy:  
 





−  𝛿 
(11) 
 







3.6.3 Social security system 
the pensions policies satisfy: 
 




The accidental bequests are defined as are given by: 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑡+1 ∫ φ𝑡+1(d𝑎 ∗ dƞ ∗ d𝑖 ∗ 𝑑𝑗) = ∫(1 − 𝜓𝑗) 𝑎
′
𝑡(𝑎, ƞ, 𝑖, 𝑗)φ𝒕(d𝑎 ∗ dƞ ∗ d𝑖 ∗ d𝑗) 
 
(14) 
3.6.5 Government  
Government budget balances as follows: 
 
𝐺𝑡 = ∫ 𝜏𝐾,𝑡𝑟𝑡 (𝑎 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡)φ𝒕(d𝑎 ∗ dƞ ∗ d𝑖 ∗ d𝑗) + ∫ 𝑇𝑡[𝑦𝑡]φ𝒕(d𝑎 ∗ dƞ ∗ d𝑖 ∗ d𝑗)




3.6.6 Market clearing 
 
𝐾𝑡 = ∫ 𝑎φ𝒕(d𝑎 ∗ dƞ ∗ d𝑖 ∗ d𝑗) 
    (16) 
 
𝑁𝑡 = ∫ ԑ𝑗𝛼𝑖ƞ𝑙𝑡(𝑎, ƞ, 𝑖, 𝑗)φ𝒕(d𝑎 ∗ dƞ ∗ d𝑖 ∗ d𝑗) 




∫ 𝑐𝑡(𝑎, ƞ, 𝑖, 𝑗)φ𝒕(d𝑎 ∗ dƞ ∗ d𝑖 ∗ d𝑗) + 𝑎
′
𝑡(𝑎, ƞ, 𝑖, 𝑗)φ𝒕(d𝑎 ∗ dƞ ∗ d𝑖 ∗ d𝑗) + 𝐺𝑡
= 𝐾𝑡
𝛼(𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡)
1−𝛼 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡 
 
  (18) 
3.6.7 Law of motion 
 φ𝒕+𝟏 = 𝐻𝑡(φ𝑡)  (19) 
where the function 𝐻𝑡 ∶ 𝑴 → 𝑴 can be explicitly written as: 
a) for all ꝭ such that 1 𝜖 ꝭ: 
         φ𝒕+𝟏(A ∗ E ∗ Ꝭ ∗ ꝭ) = ∫ 𝑃𝑡((𝑎, ƞ, 𝑖, 𝑗); A ∗ E ∗ Ꝭ ∗ ꝭ)φ𝒕(d𝑎 ∗ dƞ ∗ d𝑖 ∗ d𝑗)   (20) 
 
       where 𝑃𝑡((𝑎, ƞ, 𝑖, 𝑗);  A ∗ E ∗ Ꝭ ∗ ꝭ) =  {
𝑄(𝑒, 𝐸)𝜓𝐽   if  𝑎
′
𝑡(𝑎, ƞ, 𝑖, 𝑗) 𝜖 𝐴, 𝑖 𝜖 Ꝭ, 𝑗 + 1 𝜖 ꝭ 
0                 else                                                         
 
 (21) 
  b) φ𝒕+𝟏(A ∗ E ∗ Ꝭ ∗ {1}) = (1 + 𝑛)
𝑡 {
∑ 𝑝𝑖  𝑖 𝜖 Ꝭ   if  0 𝜖 𝐴, ƞ 𝜖 𝐸
0               else                   
  (22) 
 
Definition 2: a stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which 𝑏𝑡 = 𝑏1, 𝜏𝑐,𝑡 = 𝜏𝑐,1, 
𝐺𝑡 = (1 + 𝑛)
𝑡−1𝐺1, 𝑎
′
𝑡(. ) = 𝑎
′
1(. ), 𝑐𝑡(. ) = 𝑐1(. ), 𝑙𝑡(. ) = 𝑙1(. ), 𝑁𝑡 = (1 + 𝑛)
𝑡−1𝑁1,  
𝐾𝑡 = (1 + 𝑛)
𝑡−1𝐾1, 𝑇𝑡 = 𝑇1, 𝜏𝑠𝑠,𝑡 = 𝜏𝑠𝑠,1, 𝑆𝑆𝑡 = 𝑆𝑆1, 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟1, 𝑤𝑡 = 𝑤1, 𝑇𝑟𝑡 = 𝑇𝑟1, for all 𝑡 ≥ 1 and 
for 𝐴 𝜖 𝑹+. That is, per capita variables and functions as well as prices and policies are constant, and 
aggregate variables grow at the constant growth rate of the population n. 
3.7 Computing the equilibrium: The Python program 
This paragraph explains briefly how the Python program coded for this analysis works. 
Initally are defined the choices for the last generation, who face no possibility of surviving in the next 
period: the investment (asset choice) is zero because it is not possible anymore to derive any utility 
in the future. The labour choice is also zero by the moment they retire at age 65. The consumption 
and value functions are then computed for agents in every asset level. The consumption coincides 
with the Social Security and the asset level, net of taxes (on income and on consumption). The value 
function for every level of asset is the utility function, with zero labour and the consumption 
previously computed. 
For the younger cohort ages the choices distributions are compiled backward (for every asset level). 
From the age of 98 to 65 no labour is supplied by agents, so the only choice involved is the one on 
consumption and investment. This choice is derived with respect to the Euler equation (the derivation 








Lower bound and upper bounds are computed (it is derived the utility for the lowest and for the 
highest level of asset choice) in case the Euler function does not allow a maximum inside this interval 
assumed for the asset grid. 
Once the optimal consumption level is found for every possible asset level, the computation of Value 
function is straight forward.  
 




With 𝑐 and 𝑐′ at the optimal level. 
For agents in working age (from 64 to 25 years), the process is substantially the same: the same 
outcome is derived for every possible choice of work (66 possible from 0 to 0.99) according to the 
Euler equation:  
 




The value chosen is the work-consumption couplets that maximize the Value function for each agent. 
4 Calibration of the benchmark economy 
4.1 Demographics 
The agents enter in the economy at the age of 25 (that correspond to age 1 in the model), retire at 67 
(age 42 in the model) and die at 100 years old (75 in the model). 
The data relative to the Italian population growth is taken from Worldometers Real Time Statistics 
database, that carries out estimation for the future of the country. The long-term population growth 
parameter 𝑛 is calculated as the average annual rate for the period 1965-2040. 
Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2007) use period life tables to compute survival probabilities 𝜓𝑗, while 
a proper calibration should rather use cohort life tables to not under-estimate the life length. The 
survival probabilities employed in the model are estimated in Bucciol et al (2014) with data collected 
by the Human Mortality Database period life tables from 1979 to 2008. They distinguish the trend 




            Figure 1: survival probability distribution over life cycle 
 ln(1 − 𝜓𝑗,𝑡
𝑝 ) =  𝛼𝑗 + 𝜏𝑗χ𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗
𝜓
  (26) 
where 𝛼𝑗 and 𝜏𝑗 are age-varying parameters, χ𝑡 is a time-varying vector and 𝜖𝑗
𝜓
 is a random 
disturbance distributed as 𝑁(0, ỡ𝜓
2 ). The derived survival probability is reported in Figure 1: these 
results are about 3 years higher than official statistics from the World Health Organization (WHO) 




The coefficient of relative risk aversion 𝜎 it’s fixed over time. It is set at the value of 3, compatibly 
with the estimates found in the literature (see for instance Bucciol et Al (2014), Ventura (1999) and 
the references therein). 
The discount factor 𝛽  is calibrated so that the equilibrium of the benchmark economy implies a 
capital-output ratio of as observed in the data. According to Gardiner, Waights and Derbyschire 
(2011) the estimated capital-outout ration for the year 1995 is 2.75 and this value is compatible with 
the value often adopted in the literature. 
According to OECD’s estimates in 2018 Italians citizens worked on average 1782 hours; considering 
that the daily discretionary time of a person is 16 hours (with 8 hours of sleep), Italians worked around 
30,5% of their discretionary time. The share of consumption ϒ is calibrated so that the average time 
that individuals spend working in the model meet this estimate. 
4.3 The labour productivity process  
In every period each agent alive in the economy is endowed with one unit of time and can spend it 
either for working or leisure. The labor productivity of each individual is composed of the ability type 
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𝛼𝑖, the age-specific labour productivity component ԑ𝑗  and the idiosyncratic stochastic component ƞ. 
The logarithm of wages of a household is therefore given by: 
 log(𝑤𝑡) + log(𝛼𝑖) + log(ԑ𝑗) + log(ƞ) (27) 
The age-productivity profile {ԑ𝑗}𝑗=1
 𝑗𝑟−1 employed for this study is taken by Walewsky (2008). His 
estimates for Italy in 2004 display the maximum productivity at the age of 46, corresponding to the 
value of 1.13, as displayed in Figure 2. The wage productivity level is then normalized to 1 around 
the age of 25 (age 1 in the model) and is set equal to 0 for retired agents, so older than 67 years (43 
in the model). 
For the calibration of ability-type dependent fixed effect 𝛼𝑖, as for Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2007), 
an agent can be born in one of two possible ability type, with equal probability 𝑝𝑖 = 0.5 and fixed 
effects 𝛼1 = 𝑒
−𝜎𝛼  and 𝛼2 = 𝑒
𝜎𝛼 , so that the expected value 𝐸(log(𝛼𝑖)) = 0  is zero and the variance 
of the ability type 𝑉𝑎𝑟(log(𝛼𝑖)) = 𝜎𝛼
2 is fixed.  
Regarding the definition of the Markov process for the stochastic component of the log-wages it 
evolves as a discrete AR(1) process with five states, characterized by a persistence parameter р and 
variance 𝜎ƞ
2.  
In conclusion, the parameterization of the labour productivity process can be summarizes in the three 
parameters 𝜎𝛼
2, р, 𝜎ƞ
2 to be calibrated. The choice of these parameters targets statistics quantifying 
how cross-sectional labor income volatility evolves over the Italian individual’s life cycle: Aktas 
(2017) document the life cycle cross-sectional variance of household labor income distribution 
estimated for Italy with data that come from the archives of Italian Social Security Administration 
(INPS), covering the years from 1985 to 2012. In the model employed for this paper labour supply is 
Figure 2:  Estimated age-wage profiles for full-time employees 
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endogenous and responds optimally to the productivity process. Aktas (2017) reports a cross sectional 
variance of 0.58 at the age of 25, and around 1.36 at 60: the three parameters 𝜎𝛼
2, р, 𝜎ƞ
2 are chosen 
so that the in the calibrated benchmark economy this model displays a cross-sectional  variance profile 
consistent with these outcomes, assuming a linear distribution from the age of 25 to 60. For the 
purpose of the parameterization the Tauchen method is used to discretize the linear AR(1) process 
and derive the transition probability matrix and the reward vector.  
4.4 Technology 
The share of capital income on total income 𝛼 = 0.35 is chosen in accordance to the literature on 
General Equilibrium and OLG models; a similar choice can be found in Bucciol et al. (2014) and in 
the references therein.  
The depreciation rate of capital 𝛿, following Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2007), is targeted so that in 
stationary equilibrium the benchmark economy implies an investment to output ratio consistent with 
the observed one in Italy. CEIC Data, institution that conduct expansive and accurate data insights 
into both developed and developing economies, provides annual estimates for the national investment 
over GDP ratio. the reference indicator for the model is 21%, estimation for the year 2018. 
The Total Factor of Productivity 𝐴, following Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2007) is normalized to 1.  
4.5 Government 
The government finances public expenditure and raise funds for the minimum income through taxes 
on consumption, capital and labour income and grant an amount (REI) to individuals under a 
computed threshold. The taxes levels are chosen to represent the 2018 fiscal and benefits system.  
4.5.1 Consumption tax (IVA) 
The VAT rate in Italy (IVA) is fixed at 22%, with reductions on some category of goods. It is 4% for 
primary food such as milk, butter, cheese, vegetables, fruits, cereals, etc. On socio-sanitary and 
educational services the VAT rate is 5%. Finally, on other food that is not primary is 10%. The 
average consumption expenditure estimated by ISTAT was € 2564 per family in 2017, the 17,8% of 
which was for food. Primary food consumption accounted for 7,1% and health and education for 
5,4%. The fix consumption tax rate parameter employed in the model, 𝜏𝑐,𝑡, is the weighted average 
of the different VAT rates weighted for Italians’ consumption habits. 
4.5.2 Social Security program 
Regarding the social security system, the 66% of the social contributions are paid by the employee 
and the remaining 33% by the employer. The tax rate 𝜏𝑠𝑠,𝑡 is set to assure that the budget balance of 
the system time by time. 
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4.5.3 Separate Capital Income tax  
in Italy capital income is not subject to the IRPEF, but to a separate taxation. For income deriving 
from dividends, obligations, banking and postal interest income, certificates of deposits, and other 
sources of capital income with less than 18 months of maturity the tax rate is 26%, while for bonds, 
and similar with maturity longer than 18 months is 12,50%. Because in the model the agents can only 
invest in one-year risk free bonds, the tax rate on capital gains is set to 26%. 
4.5.4 Personal Labour Income tax (IRPEF) 
In this paragraph it will be described how the tax function that is levied on the agents’ labour income 
is composed in this paper to represent the Italian economy. In Italy the tax on labour income is 
personal and progressive, structured in the five brackets reported in the Table 1. A no tax area is 
applied for households with income below € 8174 per year, amount that goes close to the estimated 
absolute poverty threshold of € 780 per month (€9360 a year). According to ISTAT, in 2017 the 
incidence of absolute poverty in terms of individuals was 8,4%: for this study a poverty threshold 
matching this estimate is set for the no tax zone.  
The data provided by the Banca d’Italia in the Survey on Household Income and Wealth in 2014 is 
reported in Table 2: the brackets’ ranges are set to match these estimates.  
 
Income range Tax rate 
Less than €15.000 23% 
€15.000 - €28.000 27% 
€28.000 - €55.000 38% 
€55.000 - €75.000 41% 
More than €75.000 43% 
 
The quantiles of the income distribution corresponding to the IRPEF brackets are obtained from 
Table 2 and Table 3. The amount of 15.000 euros is so set as the second decile. 28.000 is the mean 
income above the fifth and sixth decile, 55.000 is the ninth decile and 75.000 is set as the mean 
income of the last decile. A higher marginal rate is paid only on the part of income exceeding the 
previous bracket. This does not work for the no-tax area: if an agent earns more than the no tax 
threshold, must pay taxes on all the labour income.  
The Italian fiscal scheme also provides a system of deductions and detractions for the IRPEF; in the 
model it is included a fix deduction on labour income only for agents earning less than € 55.000 (ninth 
decile of the income distribution in the model). By the moment that households are represented as 
Table 1: IRPEF brackets 
pag. 22 
 
individuals, no family deductions or allowances, or neither any other kind of reduction (eg. for 
total/partial disability, war servants, etc.) are considered 
Mean income and share of income by deciles of households 
Household deciles Decile (€) Mean Income (€) 
Up to the 1st decile 10.400 6.521 
1st  to 2nd decile  14.982 12.840 
2nd  to 3rd  decile  18.165 16.633 
3rd to 4th  decile  21.600 19.905 
4th to 5th  decile 25.108 23.320 
5th to 6th  decile 30.065 27.442 
6th to 7th  decile 36.018 32.978 
7th to 8th  decile 43.748 39.610 
8th to 9th  decile 55.265 48.916 
Over the 9th decile  77.189 
 
4.5.5 The “Reddito d’Inclusione” - REI 
Finally, the benchmark economy calibrated for the 2018 tax-benefits system includes the REI 
(Reddito di Inclusione), a pro-poor instrument introduced in 2017 to sustain families with income 
under the absolute poverty threshold.  The REI is included in the model as a negative income tax (so 
inside the personal income tax function) and a parameter adjusts the maximum amount that is paid to 
households and the deduction on the personal labour income tax to clear the market, so that the tax 
total tax revenue compensates the chosen government expenditure level.  
4.5.6 Individual tax function specification T[.] 
The individual labour income tax function is specified as follow: 
𝑇[𝑦𝑡] = 
−( 𝑝 ∗ 𝒯 − 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡))                                                                                      𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) ≤ 𝑝 ∗ 𝒯 
0                                          𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) ≤ 𝒯 
0.23 ∗ min (𝑦𝑡 −
𝑝
𝑠
, 0)                                𝑖𝑓 𝒯 ≤ 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) ≤ 𝑏1 
0.23 ∗ 𝑏1 + 0.27 ∗ (𝑦𝑡 − 𝑏1 −
𝑝
𝑠
)                                                                     𝑖𝑓 𝑏1 ≤ 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) ≤ 𝑏2 
0.23 ∗ 𝑏1 + 0.27 ∗ 𝑏2 + 0.41(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑏2 −
𝑝
𝑠
)                 𝑖𝑓 𝑏2 ≤ 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) ≤ 𝑏3 
Table 2: income distribution by Banca d’Italia 
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0.23 ∗ 𝑏1 + 0.27 ∗ 𝑏2 + 0.38 ∗ 𝑏3 + 0.41 ∗ (𝑦𝑡 − 𝑏3)                                     𝑖𝑓 𝑏3 ≤ 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) ≤ 𝑏4 
0.23 ∗ 𝑏1 + 0.27 ∗ 𝑏2 + 0.38 ∗ 𝑏3 + 0.41 ∗ 𝑏4 + 0.43(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑏4)                   𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) > 𝑏4 
  (28) 
Where 𝑦𝑡 denotes the individual labour earnings net of social contributions, 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) the 
individual capital earnings.  𝒯 is the absolute poverty threshold (computed as quantile 0.084 of the 
income distribution, according to ISTAT estimates for 2018) and 𝑏1, 𝑏2, 𝑏3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏4 correspond to 
the brackets of the progressive labour income tax, set to match the estimates displayed in Table 2 as 
described in paragraph 4.5.4. Finally 𝑝 and 𝑠 are parameters defining both the minimum income 
amount granted in the benchmark economy (REI) and the fixed deduction on the individual labour 
income.  
The following observations may be useful for a better understanding of the individual labour tax 
function 𝑇[𝑦𝑡]: 
- 𝑝 ∗ 𝒯 define level of minimum income “REI” granted in the benchmark economy. For 
instance, if in the stationary equilibrium it is found that 𝑝 equal to 0,5 the minimum income 
measure will be granted only for citizens with earnings below the half of the absolute poverty 
threshold within the country, and 𝑝 ∗ 𝒯 is the maximum possible amount granted by the 
government. This means that an agent earning 200 in an economy where the poverty threshold 
is 1000, will receive by the government 1000 ∗ 0,5 − 200 = 300. An agent earning 0 
receives 500 and to an agent earning 500 nothing will be granted. 
- 𝑠 is a parameter meant to proportionate the minimum income amount granted and the fixed 
deduction on labour income 
𝑝
𝑠
. This deduction is available for income smaller than €55.000, 
so below the ninth decile (Table 2).  
4.6 The benchmark economy 
To follow a brief commentary on the parametrized benchmark economy. Table 3 lists the relevant 
variables that are calibrated in the model. The parameterization of the benchmark model has been 
conducted so these measures result proportionate to the two observed in Italy: the absolute poverty 
threshold have been estimated by ISTAT to be €780 monthly, the deduction about €8000 for income 
smaller than €55.000 a year and the maximum amount granted by the government with the REI for a 
poor individual has been estimated by INPS to be around €200 a month. In the stationary equilibrium 
the benchmark economy reports a parameter of 0.402, meaning that the 40,2% of the absolute poverty 
threshold is level of minimum income (REI) granted to an individual before the reform, so about 
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€310. The fixed deduction  
𝑝
𝑠
  results 0.0201 (the parameter 𝑠 is set to be 20), value close to the one 
of the absolute poverty threshold, as observed in the empirical evidence. 
Parametrization 
Category Variable Value Target/Source 
Demographics population growth 𝑛 0.236% per year Worldomoeters 
 Survival probabilities 𝜓𝑗 distribution Bucciol et Al. (2004) 
 Age of birth in the model 𝑗1 25 years (1) Birth age (assumed) 
 Retirement age 𝑗𝑟 67 years (43) Old age retirement 
 Maximum age 𝐽 100 years (76) Certain death  
Preferences Discount factor 𝛽 0.966 K/Y (Gardiner) = 2.75 
 Risk aversion 𝜎 3 Ventura (1999) 
 Consumption share ϒ 0.4 Avrg hours worked: 0.305 
Labor productivity age-productivity profile ԑ𝑗 distribution Walewsky (2008) 
 Variance types 𝜎𝛼
2 0.2945 Aktas (2017)  
 Persistence р 0.9394 Aktas (2017) 
 Variance shock 𝜎ƞ
2 0.3841 Aktas (2017) 
Technology Capital share  𝛼 0.35 Bucciol et Al. (2004) 
 Depreciation rate 𝛿 0.077 I/Y (CEIC Data) = 0.21 
 Scale parameter 𝐴 1 Normalized 
Government Consumption tax 𝜏𝑐,𝑡 18,5% ISTAT 
 Capital income tax 𝜏𝑘,𝑡 26% Short-time cap inc tax 
 Poverty threshold 𝒯 0.0202 ISTAT (quantile 0.084) 
 Parameter 𝑝 0.402 Banca d’Italia 
 Parameter 𝑠 20 MI-deduction proportion 
 Social security tax 𝜏𝑠𝑠,𝑡 13,3% ISTAT  
 
5 Computational experiment: a Flat-Tax and minimum income reform 
The purpose of the study consists in evaluating the effect of a Flat tax and a Minimum Income reform. 
Once the model is parametrized, it is possible to proceed to the computational experiment. Keeping 
fixed the level of government spending and the absolute poverty threshold calibrated in the stationary 
equilibrium of the benchmark economy, a new tax function is defined: this is characterized by a 
constant marginal rate for the individual income and by a parameter defining the level of minimum 
income 𝑝 ∗ 𝒯  in favor of the poor agents. Just like for the benchmark economy, a parameter adjusts 
so that the total tax revenue offsets the fixed government expenditure amount previously calibrated. 
The goal is to find a marginal rate allowing the government to grant a minimum income level 
coinciding with the absolute poverty threshold 𝒯, so a marginal rate for which, in the stationary 
equilibrium, the parameter 𝑝 equals 1; to be clear an agent earning 200 in an economy where the 
threshold 𝒯 is 1000 will receive 1000 − 200 = 800. Two different experiments are conducted: the 
first consists in a Flat-Tax reforming only the personal labour income, so keeping the marginal rate 
Table 3: Calibration of the benchmark economy 
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of the capital income unchanged and second involves a unique flat marginal rate for both the 
individual labour and capital income. 
5.1 Result of the first experiment: a Flat-Tax on the personal labour income 
The first experiment consists in simulating a Flat-Tax on the personal labour income and in deriving 
the marginal rate for which the maximum level of Minimum Income granted to the underprivileged 
individuals in the economy coincides with the poverty threshold. That is, a marginal rate that would 
allow to solve the absolute poverty issue within the country (so that no agent would earn less than the 
previously calibrated absolute poverty threshold) keeping fixed the government expenditure level. 
The personal labour income tax function is so defined as 
𝑇[𝑦𝑡] = 
−( 𝑝 ∗ 𝒯 − 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡))     𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) ≤ 𝑝 ∗ 𝒯 
𝜏𝑦𝑦𝑡        𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) > 𝑝 ∗ 𝒯 
  (29) 
where 𝜏𝑦 is the Flat-Tax’s marginal rate. This rate results to be 20%: the stationary equilibrium reports 
indeed a parameter of 1,0255 meaning that the level of minimum income granted is the 102,55% of 
the poverty threshold (look in the Appendix 3).  
The Gini coefficient is the measure chosen to assess the inequalities within the country and is 
computed for both the Benchmark economy and the computational experiment: it is a measure of 
statistical dispersion intended to represent the income distribution of a nation’s residents. It is usually 
defined mathematically based on the Lorenz curve, which plots the proportion of total income of the 
Figure 3:  Lorenz curve in the benchmark economy – GINI = 0.57200 
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population that is cumulatively earned by the bottom x of the population. A line representing the 
perfect equality of income is then plotted at 45 degrees. The Gini index is finally computed as the 
ratio of the area that lies between the perfect equality and the Lorenz curve. Figure 3 and Figure 4 
provide a graphical representation of the Lorenz curve for respectively the benchmark economy and 
the Experiment 1. 
 
Worth to notice, the earnings distribution derived in the stationary equilibrium is far from reflecting 
the empirical evidence: the figure below report the actual Italian Lorenz curve, with data employed 










Figure 4:  Lorenz curve in Experiment 1 – GINI = 0.66798 
Data: “Survey on Households’ Income and Wealth” – Banca d’Italia (Gini = 0.34066) 
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In order to assess the overall state of welfare in the economy, a Utilitarian Social Welfare is derived 
as follow: 
 
𝑊(𝑐, 𝑙) = ∫ 𝑉(𝑐, 1 −  𝑙)φ𝒕(d𝑎 ∗ dƞ ∗ d𝑖 ∗ d𝑗) 
(30) 











The basic findings of this first experiment are listed in the table below. The percentual changes of the 
Computational Experiment 1 with respect to the benchmark economy are computed as: 






Under the reform it is observed an increase in the labour supply, as displayed in Table 4. As a 
consequence the aggregate output within the country increases as well, leading to a significantly 
higher level of aggregate consumption and savings. The Gini coefficient of the country is 0.6679, 
consistently increased in the experiment when compared to the Benchmark economy: this is an 
expected outcome, since by definition a progressive tax is a fiscal system meant to reduce the 
inequalities within a country. Despite the overall apparent improvement in macro aggregates, the 
equilibrium displays an unexpected decrease in the average hours worked and social welfare: an 
investigation on the causes of these effects is conducted in Chapter 6. 
 
Computable Experiment 1 
Variable Benchmark Experiment 1 
Total Labour Supply 𝑁 8,38260 9,04090   (+7,87%) 
Capital Stock 𝐾  38,9965 43,2251 (+10,96%) 
Output 𝑌 14,3567 15,6331   (+8,94%) 
Aggregate consumption 𝐶 7,41246 8,34010 (+12,49%) 
Average hours worked 0,30488 0,27965   (-8,27%) 
Gini Coefficient for Income 0,57200 0.66790 (+16,78%) 
ECV --- -1,81% 
 
5.2 Result of the second experiment: a Flat Tax on the personal labour and capital income 
The second Computational Experiment is conducted similarly to the first one: it consists in simulating 
a Flat-Tax with the same marginal rate for both the personal labour and capital income. If 𝜏𝑦 
Table 4: results of a Flat-Tax on the personal labour income 
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represents this marginal rate, the problem that faces an household earning more than the poverty level 
becomes so: 
   𝑣𝑡(𝑎, ƞ, 𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑐,𝑎′,𝑙
 (𝑢(𝑐, 1 −  𝑙) +  𝛽𝜓𝑗 ∫ 𝑣𝑡+1(𝑎
′, ƞ′, 𝑖, 𝑗 + 1)𝑄(ƞ, 𝑑ƞ′))                    subject to: 
  (1 + 𝜏𝑐,𝑡  )𝑐 + 𝑎
′ = (1 − 0.66𝜏𝑠𝑠,𝑡)
𝑤𝑡
1+0.33𝜏𝑠𝑠,𝑡
ԑ𝑗𝛼𝑖ƞ𝑙𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡)(𝑎 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) − 𝑇[𝑦𝑡]            for 𝑗 < 𝑗𝑟, 
  (1 + 𝜏𝑐,𝑡  )𝑐 + 𝑎
′ = 𝑆𝑆𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡(1 − 𝜏𝑦)) (𝑎 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) − 𝜏𝑦𝑆𝑆𝑡                   for 𝑗 ≥ 𝑗𝑟. 
  (33) 
𝑇[𝑦𝑡] = 
−( 𝑝 ∗ 𝒯 − 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡))     𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) ≤ 𝑝 ∗ 𝒯 
𝜏𝑦(𝑦𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡))      𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡(𝑎𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑡) > 𝑝 ∗ 𝒯 
  (34) 
The marginal rate found is 23%: the stationary equilibrium reports a parameter of 1,053, that means 
the maximum amount of minimum income granted in the economy is the 105,3% of the poverty 
threshold. 
A graphical representation of the Lorenz curve is plotted in Figure 5, and the Gini coefficient is 











As in the first Computational Experiment this reform (look Table 5) apparently seems to boost the 
economy, despite then displaying lower average number of hours worked and social welfare: the 
Figure 5:  Lorenz curve in Experiment 2 – GINI = 0.66542 
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increase in the aggregate labour supply brings a to higher aggregate output within the country, and as 
a consequence to higher level of consumption and savings. Again, the flat fiscal system results in a 
higher income inequality in the economy, with a Gini coefficient of 0,6654 
Computable Experiment 2 
Variable Benchmark Experiment 2 
Total Labour Supply 𝑁 8,38260 8,81568 (+5,52%) 
Capital Stock 𝐾  38,9965 41,3002 (+5,59%) 
Output 𝑌 14,3567 15,1356 (+5,43%) 
Aggregate consumption 𝐶 7,41246 7,99237 (+7,82%) 
Average hours worked 0,30488 0,25221 (-0,17%) 
Gini Coefficient for Income 0,57200 0,66542 (+16,33%) 
ECV --- -5,78% 
  
6 Discussing the results 
In order to better analyze the effects of these fiscal reforms and to understand how the new tax code 
impact the agents in different cohort ages, this chapter compares the post-reform distributions of asset 
holdings, labour supply, labour earnings and consumption for different cohort ages to the pre-reform 
ones. The discussion is conduct on the average distributions over life cycle.  
6.1 First experiment: 20% Flat-Tax on the individual labour income 
The average capital and labour eanings taxes paid by agents in different cohort ages are plotted in 
Figure 6A for the benchmark economy (continuous line) and the Computational Experiment 1 (dotted 
Table 5: results of a Flat-Tax reforming the personal labour and capital income 
Figure 6A: Experiment 1 – Average taxes over life cycle 
pag. 30 
 
line). The distribution is computed including the minimum income amount granted to the agents 
earning less than the previously calibrated threshold. It appears that agents under the age of 37 face a 
higher fiscal burden, while in other cohort ages they pay significantly lower taxes. 
In Figure 6B the effect of the fiscal reform on taxes paid are separated above low and high skilled 
agents over life cycle: high level workers under 37 face significantly higher taxes, and significantly 
lower after that age. The average tax on the other hand decreases for low skilled workers basically 
for every age due to the increase in the minimum income level, by the moment they are the ones 
benefitting the most from it. 
 The average hours worked for different cohort ages is displayed in Figure 7A. As expected from the 
results previously observed and reported in Table 4, the average hors worked seems to drop 
consistently for basically every age level, with some exception for the early aged agents. 
Figure 7A: Experiment 1 - Average hours of labour supplied over life cycle 
Figure 6B: Experiment 1 – Average taxes over life cycle per ability type 
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A further decomposition is required to understand why the aggregate labour supply in the economy 
increased after the reform despite the average hours worked by the agent have decreased (Table 4). 
For this purpose, it is reported the average distribution of labour supply over life cycle for different 
ability types in Figure 7B. In contrast to what one might suppose, young agents with high ability react 
to the reform supplying more labour despite the higher taxes paid. In this term, the simulated reform 
overall stimulates the average hours by the early aged agents, one of the main goals targeted in Italy.  
On the other hand, the average hours worked drop consistently for the low skilled ones, who are in 
fact disincentivized by the minimum income’s reform. The increase in the aggregate labour supply is 
explained by the fact that high skilled agents that react supplying more hours of labour are the ones 
with higher productivity of work, leading to an higher level of aggregate output that overcompensates 
the decrease brought by the overall decrease of hours worked caused by the low skilled ones.  
Figure 8A: Experiment 1 - Average labour earnings over life cycle 
Figure 7B: Experiment 1 - Average hours of labour supplied over life cycle per ability type 
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Figure 8A displays the average distribution of labor income over life cycle. It is possible to notice 
that in the Computational Experiment the average labour income is higher than the one computed for 
the benchmark economy for basically every age, with an exception for agents ranging from 37 to 45 
years old: this is a direct consequence of the peack of average hours worked displayed in Figure 7A. 
What is, again, worth to notice, is the increase in the labour earnings of early age agents, explained 
by the higher number of average hours worked by the high skilled ones.  
 
Figure 8B decomposes the labour earning distribution over life cycle for the two different ability 
types. The labour earnings increase for high skilled agents in every age as a direct consequence to the 
higher number of average hours worked, while decrease for low skilled workers. 
Figure 8B: Experiment 1 - Average labour earnings over life cycle per ability type 
Figure 9A: Experiment 1 - Assets distribution over life cycle 
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Figure 9A reports the average asset holding over the life cycle. The distributions display the humped 
behavior commonly found in life cycle models: in specific, it can be observed that most of the 
government revenues deriving from capital income taxes comes from the central part of the 
distributions. Agents react to the higher average earnings increasing the level of the aggregate capital 
savings overall in all the cohort ages, as the dotted line is higher substantially in every lifetime.  
Analyzing the assets distribution over life cycle for different ability type, Figure 9B shows that high 
skilled workers after the reform on increase their asset holdings due to their increased labour earnings, 
while low skilled workers under 62 years old, so basically in every working age, decrease their 
savings compared to the pre-reform scenario.  
Figure 9B: Experiment 1 - Assets distribution over life cycle per ability type 
Figure 10A: Experiment 1 - Average consumption level over life cycle 
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Finally, Figure 10A plotting the average consumption distribution over life cycle displays an increase 
in consumption for every age level. This outcome can be decomposed across high and low skilled 
agents as reported in Figure 10B: as expected, high ability level workers react to the first 
Computational Experiment increasing their consumption in any age, while low skilled agents in 
working age (younger than 67) decrease their consumption, as a result of the lower average number 
of hours worked and so of the lower labour earnings.  
6.2 Second experiment: 23% Flat-Tax on individual labour and capital income 
In this section are reported the average distributions over life cycle derived in the second 
Computational Experiment. These distributions appear to behave in a strictly analogous manner to 
the ones computed in the first Experiment: due to the large similarities, the conclusions that can be 
drawn are specular to the ones reported in the paragraph 6.1 
Figure 10B: Experiment 1 - Average consumption level over life cycle per ability level 





Figure 12A: Experiment 2 - Average hours of labour supplied over life cycle Figure 11B: Experiment 2 – Average taxes over life cycle er ability lev l 
Figure 12B: Experiment 2 - Average hours of labour supplied over life cycle per ability type 


























Figure 14A: Experiment 2 - Assets distribution over life cycle 
Figure 13A: Experiment 2 - Average labour earnings over life cycle 
















Figure 15A: Experiment 2 - Average consumption over life cycle 
Figure 14B: Experiment 2 - Assets distribution over life cycle per ability type 
Figure 15B: Experiment 2 - Average consumption over life cycle per ability type 
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6.3 Comparing the Computational Experiments 
 
Variable Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Total Labour Supply 𝑁 9,04090 8,81568  
Capital Stock 𝐾  43,2251 41,3002 
Output 𝑌 15,6331  15,1356  
Aggregate consumption 𝐶 8,34010 7,99237  
Average hours worked 0,27965 0,25221  
Gini Coefficient for Income 0.66790  0,66542  
 
The first Computational Experiment simulated in this paper consisted in a Flat-Tax with a marginal 
rate of 20% for the personal labour income and a minimum income scheme for agents under the 
poverty threshold, keeping fixed the marginal tax rate on the capital earnings at 26%. The second 
Experiment is a Flat-Tax 23% for both labour and capital income and a minimum income for poor 
agents. The key macro aggregates are stored in Table 6, comparing these results in the stationary 
equilibrium. Given the nature of the Experiments, it appears counter-intuitive the decreased aggregate 
capital stock in the second reform, by the moment it was implying a lower marginal tax rate for the 
capital earnings. A further investigation is then conducted, with reference to the distributions over 
life-cycle reported in Appendix 4. The second reform, compared to the first one, have increased the 
tax burden for high skilled agents in the economy and slightly decreased for the low skilled, who now 
rely more on the minimum income granted and so decrease their average working hours. The 
consequence is a lower level of average labour earnings for basically all the age levels. High skilled 
adopt instead a similar choice in average working hours supplied despite the higher taxes faced, 
leading to slightly lower labour earnings in all the cohort ages. Finally, the lower aggregate earnings 
translate inevitably in the initially counter-intuitive lower level of savings and consumption. 
7 Conclusion 
This paper study the effects for households in different ages of a Flat-Tax and a minimum income 
measure reforming the progressive fiscal system in Italy. It employs an OLG model structured to 
represent the peninsula’s economy, inhabited by agents characterized by different degrees of 
heterogeneity and with a permanent labour productivity and a stochastic component. The benchmark 
economy is then calibrated so that key macro aggregates observed in the empirical evidence are met. 
Then two Computational Experiments are conduct. The first consists in a proportional tax on the 
labour income reforming the progressive IRPEF and a raise of the pre-existing weak minimum 
income measure: the marginal rate of the labour income tax is computed so the government is able to 
grant an amount to all the citizens under the absolute poverty threshold, computed as quantile of the 
Table 6: Experiment 1 vs Experiment 2 
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income distribution estimated for Italy, without increasing the fiscal burden on consumption or capital 
income or neither the public debt. The second reform, similar to the first one, involves a common 
marginal rate for both the proportional labour income and capital income taxes. The marginal rates 
found in the stationary equilibrium simulated in the two Computational Experiments are respectively 
20% and 23%. Under these rates the government manage to finance a pro-poor measure so that within 
the country no one would earn anymore less than the absolute poverty threshold estimated for Italy, 
that is €780. The results seem to meet at least in part the forecasts propagated by the last times’ 
political campaigns, that have been promising a boost in the Italian economy: macroeconomic 
aggregates such as overall labour productivity, consumption and savings increase within the country. 
On the other hand, a consistent drop in the average hours worked and on the overall aggregate welfare 
and an increase in the Gini index casts some doubt on the apparent improvement and on the actual 
repartition of the reform effects across different type of agents. A deeper investigation on the source 
of these effects finally shows that the reason for the improvements in the macro aggregates comes 
from the young agents born with high level of ability, who supply higher productive work. Despite 
they perceive a higher fiscal pressure, they react supplying more hours of work and so their income 
increase: as a direct consequence, it this bring higher level of aggregate consumption and savings. 
Their work manages to offset the drastic decrease in the work supplied on the other hand by young 
low-productive agents, who in what is defined “poverty trap” and now rely more on the minimum 
income. This explains the initially counter-intuitive effects drawn off by the simulated reform. 
To conclude, according to the fiscal experiments simulated in this paper the “Reddito di Cittadinanza” 
and “Flat-Tax 15%” reforms that lately have been in the politics’ spotlight and subject of analysis in 
this paper of could eventually improve the overall economic situation in Italy in term of GDP, 
aggregate consumption and savings. Unfortunately, the significant decline of aggregate welfare 
suggests that the costs derived by the reduction of the labour supplied by youngs with low 
productivity, which among the other things are the ones that the reform itself is meant to push, may 
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The following tables report a list of the measures constituting the Italian benefits system (Social 
Insurance and Social Assistance). The classification order follows the EUROMOD 2017 Report for Italy, 
and all the information have been verified and updated to 2018. The tables moreover define some 
basic feature for each benefits instrument, to eventually consider some further implementation to the 
model in the future. 
Social Insurance 
Benefits related to the 
end of the working 
activity 
Old-Age Pension (Pensione di Vecchiaia): is related to a pay-as-you-go social security program. The 
old-age pension can be obtained when two conditions are fulfilled: age (66 and 7 month) and a 
minimum contribution (for at least 20 years). It is also provided an Early Pension possibility for people 
over a certain age (42 years and 10 months for men and 41 years and 10 months for women) who 
have paid a minimum contribution (for at least 35 years). The Early Pension is discounted by 1 
percentual point for each year of age that it takes to become 62 years old. 
Survivors Pension (Pensioni ai Superstiti): benefit for family members of a deceased insured worker. 
Eligible family members are in order: the spouse, the dependent children, dependent grandchildren, 
the parents, unmarried brothers and sisters if there are none of the above. Quotes of pension differ 
among eligible members. 
Unemployment benefit (Indennita' di Disoccupazione): ordinary unemployment benefit, 
unemployment benefit with minor requirements, ordinary agricultural unemployment benefit, 
agricultural unemployment benefit with minor requirements, special benefit for agricultural and 
building unemployment. These measures insure workers who have been dismissed. It is not granted 
to resigned employees, unless the resignation is due to good cause. Eligible conditions are: 
contribution against unemployment for at least two years or 52 weeks of contribution in the two-
years period before the date of work suspension. The benefit amount and the duration of the 
treatment is different according to the age of the employee.  
Procedure for Mobility (Mobilita'): a measure in favor of employees who have already been granted 
of redundancy payment for all the allowed period, who have been dismissed as a result of a firm 
policy of staff reduction or production transformation or for the shutdown of the firm. Eligible 
individuals are employees who have a long-term contract, have been enrolled in the mobility lists, 
have at least twelve months service in the same firm.  
Benefits related to the 
temporary suspension of 
the working activity 
Redundancy payment (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni): is a measure that supports firms in difficult 
times providing an income to employees. There are three types of redundancy payments: ordinary, 
extraordinary and building. Eligible individuals are blue collars, white collars and executives in case 
the working activity is suspended or reduced because of transitory reasons not caused by employers 
or employees behavior or temporary market stagnation. The benefit amount is up to the 80% of the 
gross wage. 
Salary supplement for agriculture workers (Integrazioni salariali a favore dei lavoratori): it is a 
measure that aims to helps firms when it is not possible to carry on working. Eligible individuals are 
employees working full time in farms for at least 180 days per year. The benefit amount is up to the 
80% of the wage received in the month before the working suspension, and it is granted for at most 
90 days.  
Marriage leave (Assegno per congedo matrimoniale): seven salary days are granted for the wedding 
of an employee. Entitled individuals are employed individuals who have been working at the wedding 
day from at least one week. Both spouses are granted if one is entitled. This benefit is provided 
without income test. 
Benefits related to the 
reduction in working 
ability, family and social 
allowances 
The Sickness Leave (Indennità di Malattia): an allowance is granted starting from the fourth day of  
sickness of the worker for a maximum of 180 days a year. The amount is given without income test 
and is equal to the 50% of the daily wage for the first 20 days, after that 66.66% of the daily wage.  
Invalidity Pension (Pensione di Invalidità) The invalidity pension is given to individuals suffering from 
some physical or mental disease that causes an inability to work, it is granted for three years and it 
can be extended if the inability persists. After three years it is automatically renewed. If instead the 




Inability Pension (Pensione di Inabilita'): entitled individuals have a contributory history of at least five 
years, three of which paid in the five years before the pension request.  
Inability Allowances for Civil Servants. Civil servants can access to different inability allowances or 
pensions. The most important ones are the Absolute and Permanent Inability to the assignment 
(Pensione per inabilità assoluta e permanente alla mansione), Absolute and Permanent Inability to 
profitable activity (Pensione per inabilità assoluta e permanente a proficuo lavoro), Absolute and 
Permanent Inability to work (Pensione per inabilità assoluta e permanente ad attivita' lavorativa) and 
the Direct Disability Pension (Pensione Diretta Privilegiata)  
Family Allowance (assegni familiari) The Family Allowance is meant to families of workers below 
determined thresholds. The thresholds and the amounts of the benefit are different according to the 
household composition and number of children 
Maternity Allowances (assegni di maternità). The Italian law provides two maternity allowances: the 
mandatory maternity leave (Indennità per astensione obbligatoria) and the parental leave (Indennità 
per astensione facoltativa o congedo parentale) 
Family leave for severe disability (Congedo retribuito per assistenza a familiari in condizione di 
handicap). It is an allowance granted to (in order of eligibility) employed parents, siblings, children, 
spouse of an individual affected by severe disability. The benefit is equal to the last wage and 
comprehends the figurative social security contribution. It is granted for at most two years and until 
an annual maximum. 
Special Sickness allowances (Indennità e assegni per malattia speciale). It is an allowance substitute 
for the wage granted to employees and family members suffering of tuberculosis. Eligible individuals 
have at least a year of contribution, then other conditions apply according to the type of allowance.  
Death Allowance (Rendita per morte) occurs whether the accident at work causes the employee 
death: his family is entitled to receive an allowance equal up to the 100% of previous year wage, 50% 
to the spouse and 20% to each child. 
Hours of Rest (Riposi orari, ex allattamento). Within the first year of age, the mother (also the 
adoptive mother) is entitled to two hours of rest each day if the working hours are at least six, one if 
the working hours are less than six.  
Daily permits for blood and spinal cord donors (Permessi giornalieri per donatori di sangue e midollo). 
Daily permits for mountain and spelaeological rescuers (Permessi giornalieri per i volontari del 
soccorso alpino e speleologico).  
Other Benefits Compensation benefit (Pensioni Indennitarie) The compensation benefit is given to workers disabled 
by an industrial accident.  
War Pension (Pensione di Guerra) The benefit is given by the Ministry of Economy and Finance to 
disabled citizens or to eligible family members of a deceased citizen because of war events. 
  
Social Assistance 
Family Support Family Allowance for families with at least three children (Assegno di sostegno per nuclei familiari 
con almeno tre figli minori) The Support Benefit for families with at least three children is granted by 
the municipalities and paid by INPS in 13 monthly instalments. The means testing criterion to be 
entitled of the allowance is based on the ISEE  
Family Allowance for families with at least four children (Assegno di sostegno per nuclei familiari con 
almeno quattro minori)  
Bonus for Babies (Bonus bebe’). A monthly allowance of €80 (€960.00 per year) is granted for each 
child born and is paid up to the end of the third year of age or the third year of entry in the household 
in the case of adoption, to families with a ISEE income not exceeding €25,000 per year.  
Allowance for the birth or adoption: an amount of 800 euro is granted for the birth of each child or 
adoption.  
Scholarships and Free Textbooks Supplies. The Ministry of Public Education gives each year funds to 
the regional scholastic offices to finance scholarships and free textbooks supplies.  
Pro-poor Allowances Social Pensions and Social Allowances to individuals older than 65 (Assegni sociali a ultra 
sessantacinquenni) It consist in an amount granted to poor individuals older than 65 years without 
any income source or an income under a certain thresold. The monthly amount is related to the 
income level and the family status of the entitled individual and it is index-linked to the minimum 
pensions granted by INPS.  
Minimum Incursion Income (reddito Minimo di incursion - REI): a measure meant to tackle poverty 
and social exclusion. Eligible families have an income below the fixed threshold and satisfy at least 
one of the following conditions: presence of an under-age person, ab invalid, a pregnant woman, 
having been dismissed from the previous job by at least 3 months. The amount granted changes 
according to the family dimension and income. 
pag. 44 
 
Housing Benefit: monetary transfers issued by Regions in order to help households the purchase of 
the main residence or for paying the rent. It is a measure in favor of a special kinds of households, 
such as young couples, couples with young children or single mothers. The issued amount changes 
among Regions and citizens can take advantages of Housing Benefits according to an eligibility 
criteria (that differs according to the Region), and a selectivity criteria (that necessarily rule out 
eligible individual, due to the limited budget). Regions have access to a special location-fund (Fondo 
nazionale per il sostegno all'accesso alle abitazioni in locazione) that is fixed by law each year. 
Basic Needs Debit Card (Carta acquisti) It is a pro-poor allowance granted every two months on a 
special debit card. This card can be used for purchases in grocery stores, superstores, pharmacies or 
gas and electricity bills in postal offices. The benefit amount is 80 euro every two months. Moreover, 
there are agreements with some shops which allow a 5% discount. Entitled individuals are poor 
citizens older than 65 or parents of children younger than 3 having an Indicator of Equivalent 
Economic Situation (ISEE) below a threshold defined yearly.  
Young Culture Card (Carta Giovani per la Cultura) An electronic card with a maximum amount of 
€500 expendable in education and culture has been issued for all Italian citizens who turn eighteen  
Benefits related to the 
reduction in working 
ability 
Civil Infirmity Allowance (Prestazione di invalidita' civile). Individuals with total invalidity, in working 
age, with an income smaller than the fixed thresholds and without any other benefit granted for the 
same invalidity reason are eligible for an allowance, granted for 13 months of 279,47 euro.  
Monthly Assistance Allowance (Assegno mensile di assistenza). Individuals with an invalidity between 
74% and 99%, in working age, who are not capable of working, without any other allowances and 
with an annual income below the fixed thresholds are eligible for an allowance, granted for 13 
months, of 279,47 euro.  
Accompany Benefit (Indennita' di accompagnamento). Are eligible individuals with total invalidity, 
who are not able to walk or carry daily life activities.  
Frequency Benefit (Indennita' di frequenza) It is a benefit awarded for 13 months to minor citizens 
living in Italy and foreigners with long-term residence permit, who are enrolled in schools, vocational 
schools, rehabilitative institutions, having persistent troubles in daily life activities or having ear 
damages. 
Blindness Pension (Pensione di cecità). It consists in a monthly allowance provided for individuals 
affected by absolute blindness.   
Special Benefit (Indennita' speciale): an allowance for Individuals affected by partial blindness  
Deaf-Dumb Pension (Pensione ai sordomuti): a monthly transfer for deaf-dumb individuals. After 65 
years and three months of age, the pension is turned into a social allowance.  
Communication Benefit (Indennità di comunicazione)  
Personal, Long-term Assistance Allowance (Assegno per assistenza personale continuativa)  
 
Fiscal measures 
Personal Income Tax (IRPEF - Imposta sui redditi delle persone fisiche): it is an individual and progressive tax on total 
income. Family dimension and composition is also taken into account by the system of deductions and tax credits. 
The definition of taxable income is broad, but the actual tax base is smaller because several income sources are 
subject to separate taxation. The tax base is made of income from land and buildings, from employment and self-
employment, business income and capital income in a marginal way (only a quote of dividends and capital gains from 
dividends). 
Personal Income Regional Additional Tax (IRPEF Addizionale regionale) is subject to the same tax base of the IRPEF. 
The tax rate is made of two components: a mandatory rate and an additional discretional rate defined by each region 
within certain limits. 
Separate Taxation on Capital Income (Imposte sostitutive sui redditi da capitale). Capital income is split in 
two groups: income deriving from financing relationships and Income from investment financial assets. 
The first category is subject to withholding taxes that can be of 26% if they refer to interest on dividends, 
bonds, bank, post office or 12.5% if they refer to interest on government bonds, postal savings bonds or 
equivalent securities issued by international bodies from foreign states white list (a lower rate to 
incentivize long-term investments). The second group, on the other hand, address to income that derives 
from the participation in the risk capital of IRES companies or taxable persons. For this category the tax 
rate changes according to the subject the capital income is addressed to: individuals, partnerships or 
corporations. 
Corporate Tax (IRES - Imposta sui redditi delle società): a proportional tax on net profits of corporates. The basis is 
computed by summing up revenues (trade of goods, services, bonds, shares), capital gains, perceived dividends and 
interests (at nominal value), stocks and subtracting the cost of labor, of goods and services, capital losses, paid 
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interests, depreciation and current losses. The tax rate is 24% for 2018 and is possible to deduct the 10% of the IRAP 
from the IRES.  
Value Added Tax (IVA - Imposta sul valore Aggiunto) The base of the Value Added Tax is the total business value 
added minus investment expenses, and therefore coincides with the value of final consumption. The tax rate is 22%, 
but for primary goods it is applied a lower rate.  
Regional Tax on Business (IRAP - Imposta sui Redditi delle Attività Produttive) IRAP provides about a half of the 
financing for Regions (mainly devoted to the health system). The tax is imposed on commercial business and on 
public administrations. It is charged on the net added value resulting from the business defined as the sum of labor 
costs, interests paid and profits, net from depreciation. 
Municipality Property Taxes: IMU (Imposta Municipale Propria) and TASI (Tassa sui Servizi Indivisibili) are addressed 
to owners of buildings, areas or lands located in Italy, or to individuals enjoying some real rights on that building 
areas or lands, or again on lessees. These measures don’t weight on the main residence, except for luxury flats, villas, 
castles and palaces of historic or artistic importance. For what concerns IMU, the tax base for registered buildings is 
the cadastral value increased by 5% and multiplied by a coefficient that differs according to the building type. Tax 
rates are different according to the type of building and municipalities can modify them. For the first residences 
there is a tax credit of 200 euro (more 50 euros for each child living in the household who is less than 26). The sum of 
TASI and IMU cannot exceed the 1.06%.  
There is a wide amount of other indirect taxes, traditionally classified in business taxes, taxes on production, 
monopoly and State lottery. The Registration Duty (Imposta di Registro) is applied upon a legal registration or 
operation. its main source of revenues is connected to real estate transaction and corporate operations. The 
Mortgage Duty (Imposta Ipotecaria) regards mortgage institutions, modifications and transcriptions concerning real 
estate’s immovable. The Stamp Duty (Imposta di Bollo) weights on acts, notices, posters, advertisements.  Excise 
duties on energy which particularly is applied to oil derivatives, but also hits beer and spirits.  Monopoly and State 
lottery provides a non-negligible source of revenue. 
 
Social contributions 
Social Contributions that employees, employers and self-employed individuals pay on earned income. They 
are managed by the National Institute of Social Security (INPS). The amount differs according to the source 
of income (whether the individual is employed or self-employed), number of persons working in the firm, 
sector of the firm, occupational status (executives, white collars, blue collars). The following insurances are 
financed by Social Contributions: Invalidity, Old Age and Survivors (Invaliditá, Vecchiaia, Superstiti), 
Unemployment (Disoccupazione), Dependency benefit Fund (Cassa Unica Assegni Familiari), Redundancy 
Fund (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni), Procedure for mobility and Collective Dismissals (Mobilità), Sickness 

















Derivation of the Euler equation 





                                                     s.t.             𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑡+1 = 𝐹(𝑎𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡) 
∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑢𝑡 = 𝑢0 + 𝛽𝑢1 + 𝛽
2𝑢2 + ⋯ = 𝑢(𝑐0, 𝑙0) + 𝛽(𝑢1 + 𝛽𝑢2 + 𝛽




  𝛽(𝑢1 + 𝛽𝑢2 + 𝛽
2𝑢3 + ⋯ ) = 𝑉(𝑎1) 
 
𝑉(𝑎) = max (𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙) + 𝛽𝑉(𝑎′)) 
                                                     s.t.             𝑐 + 𝑎′ = 𝐹(𝑎, 𝑙) 
𝐿 = 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙) + 𝛽𝑉(𝑎′) − 𝜆(𝑐 + 𝑎′ − 𝐹(𝑎, 𝑙)) 
𝑐)    𝑢𝑐 = 𝜆                 
                                                                               𝑙)    𝑢𝑐 = −𝜆𝐹𝑙   





























   𝑉𝑎(𝑎) = 𝜆𝐹𝑎 
𝑉𝑎′(𝑎
′) = 𝜆′𝐹𝑎′ 
𝛽𝜆′𝐹𝑎′ = 𝑢𝑐 







In this Appendix are reported the results found in the stationary equilibrium that have been computed by the 
Python program. The program starts with some guesses for the endogenous variables and at the end of the 
process compute the new guesses. The same process is then iterated until the difference between the values 
found and the previous ones is smaller than a tolerance error, that is set to 0.0025.   
The calibration of the four parameters (discount factor 𝛽, consumption share ϒ, Depreciation rate 𝛿 and level 
of government expenditure) is conduct so that in the stationary equilibrium the benchmark economy meets 
three targets observed in the Italian economy: capital over GDP, investment over GDP and the average hours 
worked. Below are reported these targets and the equilibrium results in the benchmark economy. 
 Targets Benchmark economy 
K/Y 2.75 2.71666 
I/Y 0.21 0.21559 
Avg hours worked 0.305 0.30488 
 
Finally, the last table lists the endogenous variables and the relevant macroeconomics aggregates found in the 
stationary equilibrium for the benchmark model and the two computational experiments. This table will come 
to use in comparing the experiments results.  
  Benchmark Exp 1 Exp 2 
Endogenous variables Interest rate 0. 051841 0.049532 0.051186 
 Labour supply 8. 382604 9.040901 8.815682 
 SS benefits 0. 402282 0.074245 0.071922 
 Parameter 0. 402282 1.025456 1.053045 
 Threshold 0. 020221 --- --- 
Macro aggregates K/Y 2.71666 2.766708 2.731338 
 I/Y 0.21559 0.219566 0.216759 
 G/Y 0.24379 0.223884 0.221243 
 C/Y 0.51631 0.533490 0.538051 








This Appendix reports a comparison the distribution for average taxes paid, hours worked, labour earnings, 
consumption and assets holdings across agents in different cohort ages for the two Computational 
Experiments (Experiment 1 in blue, Experiment 2 in red, left Figures). The effects are further decomposed 
above agents in different ability levels. 
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